---
phase: 21-autotask-triage-note
verified: 2026-07-16T16:30:00Z
status: passed
score: 8/8 must-haves verified
overrides_applied: 0
---

# Phase 21: Autotask Triage Note Verification Report

**Phase Goal:** Once a campaign is classified, a human-readable, sanitized internal triage note either gets posted to the Autotask ticket (if a safe write path already exists) or is returned via API for manual use — never a raw/unsanitized dump, never a silent no-op.
**Verified:** 2026-07-16T16:30:00Z
**Status:** passed
**Re-verification:** No — initial verification

## Goal Achievement

### Observable Truths

| # | Truth | Status | Evidence |
|---|-------|--------|----------|
| 1 | If Pulse has a safe existing Autotask note-writing method, triggering note generation posts an internal triage note summarizing classification, evidence, blast radius, and recommended actions to the originating ticket | ✓ VERIFIED | `workflow-engine.ts:583-589` is the pre-existing safe write path (`createEntity('TicketNotes', {..., noteType:1, publish:1})`), confirmed by direct inspection. `triage-note-service.ts:176-182` reuses the identical shape, looping over every `reports` row linked to the campaign (`campaign_id = $1`) and posting one `TicketNotes` write per ticket (D-01). `formatTriageNote` (`triage-note-format.ts:80-133`) renders verdict, confidence, summary, reasons, blast radius (both branches), recommended actions, and current remediation state as labeled prose sections. |
| 2 | The posted (or returned) note text is sanitized — no raw secrets/tokens/full malicious URL query strings appear in it | ✓ VERIFIED | `triage-note-sanitize.ts` — `sanitizeUrl` strips query+fragment unconditionally (origin+pathname only, `sanitizeUrl.ts:44-54`); `sanitizeNoteText` redacts Bearer/Authorization sequences and credential-style query params (`token\|secret\|password\|api[_-]?key\|key\|credential`, case-insensitive). `formatTriageNote` routes every URL through `sanitizeUrl` (line 115) and the entire assembled string through `sanitizeNoteText` (line 132) before returning — defense-in-depth so no field can bypass redaction. 25/25 Vitest tests pass, including explicit assertions that `'token=leak'`/`'access_token=SECRET'`/`'password=p'` substrings are absent from output while bare emails and 64-char hex hashes are preserved (evidence, not secrets, per CONTEXT.md). |
| 3 | If no safe note-writing path exists, the same note content is returned via the API response instead of attempting any Autotask write, and no partial/unsanitized write is ever attempted as a fallback | ✓ VERIFIED | Pulse DOES have a safe write path (confirmed truth #1), so the "otherwise" branch of NOTE-01 applies only to the D-05 per-ticket-failure case (per 21-CONTEXT.md's explicit reading of NOTE-01). `triage-note-service.ts:172-192` wraps each ticket's write in its OWN try/catch INSIDE the loop — one failure is captured as `{ posted:false, error }` without aborting remaining writes, and `noteText` (already fully sanitized) is unconditionally returned in the result regardless of write outcome (D-06). No retry-with-unsanitized-text or partial-write fallback path exists anywhere in the service. Verified by test "always returns non-empty noteText even when a write fails (D-06)" and "captures a single ticket write failure without aborting the remaining writes (D-05)" — both pass. |

**Score:** 3/3 roadmap truths verified (plus 5 additional PLAN-level must-haves below, all verified)

### Required Artifacts

| Artifact | Expected | Status | Details |
|----------|----------|--------|---------|
| `lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.ts` | `sanitizeUrl` + `sanitizeNoteText` pure functions | ✓ VERIFIED | Both exported, pure (no I/O), `REDACTED_MARKER` constant present; module-level SECURITY-CRITICAL comment mirrors `itglue-redact.ts` convention |
| `lib/services/triage-note-format.ts` | `TriageNoteEvidence` interface + `formatTriageNote(evidence)` | ✓ VERIFIED | Interface exported with all required fields (campaignId, reportCount, verdict, confidence, blastRadius: BlastRadiusResult, remediationActions, urls, etc.); formatter imports and routes through sanitizer |
| `lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.test.ts` | Vitest coverage of URL-query stripping + secret redaction | ✓ VERIFIED | 8 test cases, all pass |
| `lib/services/triage-note-format.test.ts` | Vitest coverage of note sections + no-raw-secret invariant | ✓ VERIFIED | 9 test cases, all pass |
| `lib/services/triage-note-service.ts` | `generateAndPostTriageNote(campaignId)` orchestrator | ✓ VERIFIED | Exported async function; gathers reports/classification/remediation/indicator-URL evidence, calls formatter, posts per-ticket TicketNotes with independent try/catch |
| `lib/services/triage-note-service.test.ts` | Vitest coverage of per-ticket write loop + partial-failure + indicator-URL flow | ✓ VERIFIED | 8 test cases (all-succeed, one-fails-isolation, note-text-always-returned, sanitized-URL-flow, zero-indicators, string-confidence-coercion, zero-reports, no-classification), all pass |
| `app/api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/triage-note/route.ts` | POST route: permission gate + UUID guard + campaign-exists check + service delegation | ✓ VERIFIED | Exports `POST`; calls `requirePermission('phishing','analyze')`, UUID_RE guard (400), campaign-exists check (404), delegates to `generateAndPostTriageNote`, returns result verbatim, 500 catch on whole-request failure |

### Key Link Verification

| From | To | Via | Status | Details |
|------|-----|-----|--------|---------|
| `triage-note-format.ts` | `triage-note-sanitize.ts` | `import { sanitizeUrl, sanitizeNoteText }` | ✓ WIRED | Line 17; both functions called (lines 115, 132) |
| `triage-note-format.ts` | `mimecast-blast-radius.ts` | `import type { BlastRadiusResult }` | ✓ WIRED | Line 18; both discriminated-union branches rendered (`formatBlastRadiusSection`) |
| `route.ts` | `triage-note-service.ts` | `generateAndPostTriageNote(id)` | ✓ WIRED | Called at line 49, result returned verbatim via `NextResponse.json(result)` |
| `triage-note-service.ts` | Autotask TicketNotes | `getAutotaskClient().createEntity('TicketNotes', ...)` | ✓ WIRED | Line 176; `noteType: 1`, `publish: 1` matching the confirmed safe-write precedent in `workflow-engine.ts:583-589` |
| `triage-note-service.ts` | `triage-note-format.ts` | `formatTriageNote(evidence)` | ✓ WIRED | Line 168 |
| `triage-note-service.ts` | indicators (via messages/reports) | `JOIN messages ... JOIN reports ... WHERE indicator_type = 'url'` | ✓ WIRED | Lines 116-122; matches schema in `migrations/097_phishing_triage_schema.sql` exactly (indicators.message_id → messages.id, messages.report_id → reports.id, reports.campaign_id) |
| `route.ts` | `lib/auth-utils.ts` | `requirePermission('phishing', 'analyze')` | ✓ WIRED | Line 27; `phishing:analyze` confirmed granted to user/admin/super-admin in `lib/permissions.ts:33,50,64` (read-only role at line 78 lacks it, correctly gated) |

### Data-Flow Trace (Level 4)

| Artifact | Data Variable | Source | Produces Real Data | Status |
|----------|---------------|--------|---------------------|--------|
| `triage-note-service.ts` evidence object | `urls` | Real SQL join `indicators → messages → reports` filtered `indicator_type='url'`, NOT derived from `reports.evidence` (which has no url field, confirmed against schema and service comment) | Yes | ✓ FLOWING |
| `triage-note-service.ts` evidence object | `confidence` | `classifications.confidence::float8` SQL cast + defensive `Number()` runtime coercion — test explicitly seeds a string `'0.92'` from the mock and asserts `typeof === 'number'` | Yes | ✓ FLOWING |
| `triage-note-service.ts` evidence object | `remediationActions` | `SELECT ... FROM remediation_actions WHERE campaign_id = $1` — live current state, not frozen at classify-time | Yes | ✓ FLOWING |
| `triage-note-service.ts` evidence object | `blastRadius` | Fresh `getBlastRadius()` call per invocation (not read from a persisted/stale column) | Yes | ✓ FLOWING |

### Behavioral Spot-Checks

| Behavior | Command | Result | Status |
|----------|---------|--------|--------|
| Sanitizer + formatter + service unit test suites | `npx vitest run lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.test.ts lib/services/triage-note-format.test.ts lib/services/triage-note-service.test.ts` | 3 files, 25/25 tests passed | ✓ PASS |
| Type-check clean (whole repo, not just phase files) | `npx tsc --noEmit --pretty` | No output (0 errors) | ✓ PASS |
| Route reachable and requires auth (not a public bypass route) | `grep phishing middleware.ts` | No match — `/api/phishing/*` is NOT in the public-routes allowlist, so middleware's session-cookie check applies before `requirePermission` runs | ✓ PASS |
| Safe-write-path premise (NOTE-01's "if a safe path exists") independently confirmed | `grep -n "createEntity('TicketNotes'" workflow-engine.ts` | Found at line 583, `noteType:1`/`publish:1`, matching what the new service reuses | ✓ PASS |

### Requirements Coverage

| Requirement | Source Plan | Description | Status | Evidence |
|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------|----------|
| NOTE-01 | 21-01-PLAN.md, 21-02-PLAN.md | Post a sanitized internal triage note (classification, evidence, blast radius, recommended actions) to the originating ticket via the existing safe write path; if no such path existed, return note text via API instead | ✓ SATISFIED | Full pipeline exists and is tested end-to-end: sanitizer (25 tests incl. this file) → formatter → service (evidence gather + per-ticket post loop) → route (auth-gated, UUID-guarded, 404-on-missing-campaign). Note: `.planning/REQUIREMENTS.md` line 100 still shows `[ ]` (unchecked checkbox) for NOTE-01 despite the phase being functionally complete — this is a documentation-sync gap, not an implementation gap (see Anti-Patterns below). |

No orphaned requirements found — REQUIREMENTS.md line 204 maps NOTE-01 to "Phase 21" and it is the only requirement ID declared across both plan frontmatters for this phase.

### Anti-Patterns Found

| File | Line | Pattern | Severity | Impact |
|------|------|---------|----------|--------|
| `.planning/REQUIREMENTS.md` | 100 | NOTE-01 checkbox still `[ ]` (unchecked) despite full implementation + passing tests | ℹ️ Info | Cosmetic/tracking-doc gap only — does not affect goal achievement. No `TBD`/`FIXME`/`XXX`/`TODO`/`HACK`/`PLACEHOLDER` markers found in any of the 7 phase-created source/test files. |

No blockers. No warnings. Scanned all 7 files created by this phase for debt markers, stub patterns, empty implementations, and hardcoded-empty data — none found.

### Human Verification Required

None. This phase is API/service-only (no new UI per CONTEXT.md's "UI hint: no"), all logic is pure-function or DB/Autotask-integration testable via mocks, and all behaviors are covered by automated Vitest assertions plus direct source/schema cross-referencing. No visual, real-time, or subjective-UX behavior to verify.

### Gaps Summary

No gaps. All three roadmap success criteria and all PLAN-frontmatter must-haves (truths, artifacts, key links) are verified against the actual codebase — not just SUMMARY.md claims. Both plans' commits (`cc93707`, `226f300`, `b4e05eb`, `17ba0e8`, `34a0269`, `2d410f8`, `e3a9cb5`) exist in git history. The one non-blocking observation is the unchecked NOTE-01 checkbox in REQUIREMENTS.md, which is a tracking-document sync issue, not a code gap — the implementation, tests, and wiring all satisfy the requirement's text.

---

*Verified: 2026-07-16T16:30:00Z*
*Verifier: Claude (gsd-verifier)*
