feat(23-01): add USER_AWARENESS verdict + acknowledge_user action mapping

- Add USER_AWARENESS to the Verdict union in campaign-classifier.ts
- mapVerdictToActions('USER_AWARENESS') returns ['acknowledge_user']; not added to DESTRUCTIVE_ACTIONS so requires_approval computes false
- classifyCampaign's simulation branch now assigns verdict = 'USER_AWARENESS' directly instead of falling through to evaluateSpamVsUnwanted
- deriveDefaultParams('acknowledge_user') returns {} (no operator-editable params)
- Widen TriageNoteEvidence.verdict to admit 'USER_AWARENESS' (pure type widen, no formatting change)
- Tests: classifier simulation fixtures now assert USER_AWARENESS/acknowledge_user/requiresApproval=false; new mapVerdictToActions/computeRequiresApproval/deriveDefaultParams cases

lib/services/campaign-classifier.test.ts

@@ -186,6 +186,10 @@ describe('mapVerdictToActions', () => {
     expect(actions).toContain('isolate_endpoint');
     expect(actions).toContain('disable_forwarding_rule');
   });
+
+  it('maps USER_AWARENESS to exactly acknowledge_user', () => {
+    expect(mapVerdictToActions('USER_AWARENESS', { clicked: 0 })).toEqual(['acknowledge_user']);
+  });
 });
 
 describe('computeRequiresApproval', () => {
@@ -208,6 +212,10 @@ describe('computeRequiresApproval', () => {
     expect(computeRequiresApproval(['no_action'])).toBe(false);
     expect(computeRequiresApproval(['warn_user'])).toBe(false);
   });
+
+  it('is false for acknowledge_user (USER_AWARENESS is never destructive)', () => {
+    expect(computeRequiresApproval(['acknowledge_user'])).toBe(false);
+  });
 });
 
 // =============================================================================
@@ -353,6 +361,38 @@ describe('classifyCampaign', () => {
     }
   );
 
+  it.each([
+    ['knowbe4 (From match)', knowbe4SimMessage],
+    ['breach-secure-now (Return-Path match)', bsnSimMessage],
+  ])(
+    'classifies a known simulation sender as USER_AWARENESS with acknowledge_user recommended and requiresApproval false (%s)',
+    async (_label, fixture) => {
+      stageQueries({
+        reports: [
+          { id: 'report-1', title: fixture.subject, created_at: '2026-07-15T00:00:00.000Z', requester_email: REPORTER_EMAIL },
+        ],
+        messages: [toMessageRow('message-1', 'report-1', fixture)],
+        indicators: [],
+      });
+      getBlastRadiusMock.mockResolvedValue({
+        status: 'ok',
+        matched: 1,
+        delivered: 1,
+        held: 0,
+        rejected: 0,
+        clicked: 0,
+        perRecipient: [{ recipient: REPORTER_EMAIL, status: 'delivered' }],
+        source: 'fan-out',
+      });
+
+      const result = await classifyCampaign('campaign-1');
+
+      expect(result.verdict).toBe('USER_AWARENESS');
+      expect(result.recommendedActions).toEqual(['acknowledge_user']);
+      expect(result.requiresApproval).toBe(false);
+    }
+  );
+
   it('classifies a real non-simulation signal as THREAT with destructive recommended actions (threat tier)', async () => {
     stageQueries({
       reports: [

lib/services/campaign-classifier.ts

@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ export function computeConfidence(evidence: ConfidenceEvidenceFlags): Confidence
 // D-08: Recommended-actions vocabulary + requires_approval invariant
 // =============================================================================
 
-export type Verdict = 'SPAM' | 'UNWANTED' | 'THREAT';
+export type Verdict = 'SPAM' | 'UNWANTED' | 'THREAT' | 'USER_AWARENESS';
 
 /** Always force requires_approval:true when recommended (CLASSIFY-02). */
 export const DESTRUCTIVE_ACTIONS = new Set([
@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ export function mapVerdictToActions(verdict: Verdict, evidence: ActionEvidence):
       }
       return actions;
     }
+    case 'USER_AWARENESS':
+      return ['acknowledge_user'];
   }
 }
 
@@ -458,7 +460,7 @@ export async function classifyCampaign(campaignId: string): Promise<ClassifyResu
     let verdict: Verdict;
     const reasons: string[] = [];
     if (isSimulation) {
-      verdict = evaluateSpamVsUnwanted(evidence);
+      verdict = 'USER_AWARENESS';
       reasons.push(
         'Sender domain matches a known phishing-simulation vendor allowlist (KnowBe4/Breach Secure Now) — THREAT tier skipped'
       );

lib/services/remediation-default-params.test.ts

@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ describe('deriveDefaultParams', () => {
     });
   });
 
+  it('returns {} for acknowledge_user', () => {
+    expect(deriveDefaultParams('acknowledge_user', filledEvidence)).toEqual({});
+  });
+
   it('returns {} for an unknown/future action type', () => {
     expect(deriveDefaultParams('unknown_future_type', filledEvidence)).toEqual({});
   });

lib/services/remediation-default-params.ts

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ export function deriveDefaultParams(actionType: string, evidence: DefaultParamEv
       return { deviceId: '' };
     case 'disable_forwarding_rule':
       return { userPrincipalName: evidence.requesterEmail ?? '', ruleName: '' };
+    case 'acknowledge_user':
+      return {};
     default:
       return {};
   }

lib/services/triage-note-format.ts

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ export interface TriageNoteEvidence {
   reportCount: number;
   companyName?: string | null;
   subject?: string | null;
-  verdict: 'SPAM' | 'UNWANTED' | 'THREAT' | null;
+  verdict: 'SPAM' | 'UNWANTED' | 'THREAT' | 'USER_AWARENESS' | null;
   confidence: number | null;
   summary: string | null;
   reasons: string[];