feat(21-01): implement triage-note sanitizer

- sanitizeUrl strips query+fragment, keeps scheme+host+path, never throws
- sanitizeNoteText redacts Bearer/Authorization tokens and credential
  query-param values while preserving sender emails and attachment hashes
- All 8 sanitizer tests pass

lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/**
+ * Triage-note sanitization (Phase 21, NOTE-01).
+ *
+ * SECURITY-CRITICAL. This module exists so that no raw secret, token, or full
+ * malicious URL query string ever reaches an Autotask note posted by Pulse.
+ * `formatTriageNote()` (triage-note-format.ts) routes every URL and its final
+ * assembled output through these two pure functions before returning text
+ * that gets written to `TicketNotes`.
+ *
+ * Two things this module deliberately does NOT redact, per
+ * `.planning/phases/21-autotask-triage-note/21-CONTEXT.md` (Claude's
+ * Discretion): bare sender email addresses and attachment hashes. Those are
+ * evidence about the phishing campaign itself, not credentials belonging to
+ * Pulse or its operators — an analyst needs to see them to triage.
+ */
+
+export const REDACTED_MARKER = '[REDACTED]';
+
+/** Keys that indicate a credential-bearing query param. Broad on purpose —
+ * false positives (redacting a benign param) are acceptable; leaking a real
+ * token is not. */
+const CREDENTIAL_QUERY_KEY_PATTERN = /token|secret|password|api[_-]?key|key|credential/i;
+
+/** Matches a `key=value` pair inside a query string / free text where `key`
+ * looks like a credential. Value is greedy up to the next `&`, whitespace, or
+ * end of string. */
+const CREDENTIAL_PARAM_REGEX = /\b([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_-]*)=([^&\s]+)/g;
+
+/** Matches `Bearer <token>` or `Authorization: <value>` sequences. */
+const BEARER_AUTH_REGEX = /\b(Bearer\s+|Authorization:\s*)([^\s,;]+)/gi;
+
+/** Matches a full http(s) URL substring embedded in free text. */
+const URL_IN_TEXT_REGEX = /\bhttps?:\/\/[^\s)]+/gi;
+
+/**
+ * Strip a URL down to scheme+host+path — query string and fragment are ALWAYS
+ * removed, never selectively kept, even for seemingly-benign params. This
+ * satisfies NOTE-01's "no full malicious URL query strings" requirement
+ * without needing to distinguish safe from unsafe params.
+ *
+ * Never throws: a malformed/non-URL string falls back to truncating at the
+ * first `?` or `#`, returning the head unchanged if neither is present.
+ */
+export function sanitizeUrl(value: string): string {
+  if (!value) return value;
+
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(value);
+    return url.origin + url.pathname;
+  } catch {
+    const cutIndex = value.search(/[?#]/);
+    return cutIndex === -1 ? value : value.slice(0, cutIndex);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Redact secrets/tokens from free text destined for an Autotask note, and
+ * strip query strings from any embedded URLs. Order matters: Bearer/
+ * Authorization sequences first (they don't look like `key=value` pairs so
+ * they wouldn't otherwise be caught), then credential query-param
+ * assignments, then any remaining full URL substrings via `sanitizeUrl`.
+ *
+ * Bare email addresses and hex attachment hashes are intentionally left
+ * untouched — see module doc-comment.
+ */
+export function sanitizeNoteText(text: string): string {
+  if (!text) return text;
+
+  let out = text.replace(BEARER_AUTH_REGEX, REDACTED_MARKER);
+
+  out = out.replace(CREDENTIAL_PARAM_REGEX, (match, key: string, val: string) => {
+    if (CREDENTIAL_QUERY_KEY_PATTERN.test(key)) {
+      return `${key}=${REDACTED_MARKER}`;
+    }
+    return match;
+  });
+
+  out = out.replace(URL_IN_TEXT_REGEX, (match) => sanitizeUrl(match));
+
+  return out;
+}