From cc93707e417bb7ea0a5fe72eee4a3988991b5b0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lorentz Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 12:04:58 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 1/6] test(21-01): add failing tests for triage-note sanitizer - Cover URL query/fragment stripping, malformed-URL no-throw - Cover Bearer token and credential query-param redaction - Cover email/hash preservation (evidence, not secrets) --- lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.test.ts | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+) create mode 100644 lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.test.ts diff --git a/lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.test.ts b/lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b472dea --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'; +import { sanitizeUrl, sanitizeNoteText } from './triage-note-sanitize'; + +describe('sanitizeUrl', () => { + it('strips query string and fragment, keeping scheme+host+path', () => { + expect(sanitizeUrl('https://evil.example/login?token=abc123&next=/x#frag')).toBe( + 'https://evil.example/login' + ); + }); + + it('returns exactly the scheme+host+path for a token+fragment URL', () => { + expect(sanitizeUrl('https://evil.example/a?token=abc#f')).toBe('https://evil.example/a'); + }); + + it('does not throw on a malformed/non-URL string and strips any ?/# tail', () => { + expect(() => sanitizeUrl('not a url')).not.toThrow(); + expect(sanitizeUrl('not a url')).toBe('not a url'); + + expect(() => sanitizeUrl('')).not.toThrow(); + + expect(sanitizeUrl('not-a-url?foo=bar#baz')).toBe('not-a-url'); + }); + + it('always strips query even for benign params (not selective)', () => { + expect(sanitizeUrl('https://good.example/path?utm_source=newsletter')).toBe( + 'https://good.example/path' + ); + }); +}); + +describe('sanitizeNoteText', () => { + it('redacts an Authorization/Bearer token', () => { + const input = 'Header seen: Bearer eyJabc.def.ghi in the request'; + const output = sanitizeNoteText(input); + expect(output).not.toContain('eyJabc.def.ghi'); + expect(output).toContain('[REDACTED]'); + }); + + it('redacts credential-style query-param values inside free text', () => { + const input = 'see http://x/y?access_token=SECRET&password=p'; + const output = sanitizeNoteText(input); + expect(output).not.toContain('access_token=SECRET'); + expect(output).not.toContain('password=p'); + }); + + it('preserves a bare sender email and a 64-char hex attachment hash unchanged', () => { + const hash = 'a'.repeat(64); + const input = `Reported by attacker@evil.example with attachment hash ${hash}`; + const output = sanitizeNoteText(input); + expect(output).toContain('attacker@evil.example'); + expect(output).toContain(hash); + }); + + it('is pure and deterministic', () => { + const input = 'plain text with no secrets'; + expect(sanitizeNoteText(input)).toBe(sanitizeNoteText(input)); + }); +}); From 226f30051361dcce8fd8d3618659b4521d3f2acc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lorentz Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 12:05:34 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 2/6] feat(21-01): implement triage-note sanitizer - sanitizeUrl strips query+fragment, keeps scheme+host+path, never throws - sanitizeNoteText redacts Bearer/Authorization tokens and credential query-param values while preserving sender emails and attachment hashes - All 8 sanitizer tests pass --- lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.ts | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+) create mode 100644 lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.ts diff --git a/lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.ts b/lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b7ed4d --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.ts @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/** + * Triage-note sanitization (Phase 21, NOTE-01). + * + * SECURITY-CRITICAL. This module exists so that no raw secret, token, or full + * malicious URL query string ever reaches an Autotask note posted by Pulse. + * `formatTriageNote()` (triage-note-format.ts) routes every URL and its final + * assembled output through these two pure functions before returning text + * that gets written to `TicketNotes`. + * + * Two things this module deliberately does NOT redact, per + * `.planning/phases/21-autotask-triage-note/21-CONTEXT.md` (Claude's + * Discretion): bare sender email addresses and attachment hashes. Those are + * evidence about the phishing campaign itself, not credentials belonging to + * Pulse or its operators — an analyst needs to see them to triage. + */ + +export const REDACTED_MARKER = '[REDACTED]'; + +/** Keys that indicate a credential-bearing query param. Broad on purpose — + * false positives (redacting a benign param) are acceptable; leaking a real + * token is not. */ +const CREDENTIAL_QUERY_KEY_PATTERN = /token|secret|password|api[_-]?key|key|credential/i; + +/** Matches a `key=value` pair inside a query string / free text where `key` + * looks like a credential. Value is greedy up to the next `&`, whitespace, or + * end of string. */ +const CREDENTIAL_PARAM_REGEX = /\b([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_-]*)=([^&\s]+)/g; + +/** Matches `Bearer ` or `Authorization: ` sequences. */ +const BEARER_AUTH_REGEX = /\b(Bearer\s+|Authorization:\s*)([^\s,;]+)/gi; + +/** Matches a full http(s) URL substring embedded in free text. */ +const URL_IN_TEXT_REGEX = /\bhttps?:\/\/[^\s)]+/gi; + +/** + * Strip a URL down to scheme+host+path — query string and fragment are ALWAYS + * removed, never selectively kept, even for seemingly-benign params. This + * satisfies NOTE-01's "no full malicious URL query strings" requirement + * without needing to distinguish safe from unsafe params. + * + * Never throws: a malformed/non-URL string falls back to truncating at the + * first `?` or `#`, returning the head unchanged if neither is present. + */ +export function sanitizeUrl(value: string): string { + if (!value) return value; + + try { + const url = new URL(value); + return url.origin + url.pathname; + } catch { + const cutIndex = value.search(/[?#]/); + return cutIndex === -1 ? value : value.slice(0, cutIndex); + } +} + +/** + * Redact secrets/tokens from free text destined for an Autotask note, and + * strip query strings from any embedded URLs. Order matters: Bearer/ + * Authorization sequences first (they don't look like `key=value` pairs so + * they wouldn't otherwise be caught), then credential query-param + * assignments, then any remaining full URL substrings via `sanitizeUrl`. + * + * Bare email addresses and hex attachment hashes are intentionally left + * untouched — see module doc-comment. + */ +export function sanitizeNoteText(text: string): string { + if (!text) return text; + + let out = text.replace(BEARER_AUTH_REGEX, REDACTED_MARKER); + + out = out.replace(CREDENTIAL_PARAM_REGEX, (match, key: string, val: string) => { + if (CREDENTIAL_QUERY_KEY_PATTERN.test(key)) { + return `${key}=${REDACTED_MARKER}`; + } + return match; + }); + + out = out.replace(URL_IN_TEXT_REGEX, (match) => sanitizeUrl(match)); + + return out; +} From b4e05eb6ad36153786a22c4cf44c9322774500c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lorentz Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 12:05:59 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 3/6] test(21-01): add failing tests for triage-note formatter - Cover verdict/confidence rendering, reasons/summary sections - Cover both BlastRadiusResult branches (ok and unavailable) - Cover remediation-state rendering (empty and populated) - Cover URL sanitization and null-verdict graceful handling --- lib/services/triage-note-format.test.ts | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 104 insertions(+) create mode 100644 lib/services/triage-note-format.test.ts diff --git a/lib/services/triage-note-format.test.ts b/lib/services/triage-note-format.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ad5a73 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/services/triage-note-format.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'; +import { formatTriageNote, type TriageNoteEvidence } from './triage-note-format'; +import type { BlastRadiusResult } from './mimecast-blast-radius'; + +function baseEvidence(overrides: Partial = {}): TriageNoteEvidence { + return { + campaignId: 'campaign-1', + reportCount: 3, + companyName: 'Acme Corp', + subject: 'Your invoice is ready', + verdict: 'THREAT', + confidence: 0.85, + summary: 'Credential-harvesting link found in message body.', + reasons: ['Sender domain not in allowlist', 'URL matches known phishing indicator'], + recommendedActions: ['block_sender', 'purge_message'], + requiresApproval: true, + blastRadius: { status: 'unavailable', reason: 'not_configured' }, + remediationActions: [], + urls: [], + ...overrides, + }; +} + +describe('formatTriageNote', () => { + it('includes the verdict label and confidence value', () => { + const output = formatTriageNote(baseEvidence()); + expect(output).toContain('THREAT'); + expect(output).toContain('0.85'); + }); + + it('includes a Summary line and a Reasons section listing each reason', () => { + const output = formatTriageNote(baseEvidence()); + expect(output).toContain('Credential-harvesting link found in message body.'); + expect(output).toContain('Sender domain not in allowlist'); + expect(output).toContain('URL matches known phishing indicator'); + }); + + it('shows delivered/held/rejected/clicked counts when blast radius is ok', () => { + const ok: BlastRadiusResult = { + status: 'ok', + matched: 5, + delivered: 3, + held: 1, + rejected: 1, + clicked: 2, + perRecipient: [{ recipient: 'user@acme.example', status: 'delivered' }], + source: 'fan-out', + }; + const output = formatTriageNote(baseEvidence({ blastRadius: ok })); + expect(output).toContain('3'); + expect(output).toContain('1'); + expect(output).toContain('2'); + }); + + it('shows an explicit unavailable reason when blast radius is unavailable', () => { + const output = formatTriageNote( + baseEvidence({ blastRadius: { status: 'unavailable', reason: 'not_configured' } }) + ); + expect(output).toContain('unavailable'); + expect(output).toContain('not_configured'); + }); + + it('states no action taken when remediationActions is empty', () => { + const output = formatTriageNote(baseEvidence({ remediationActions: [] })); + expect(output.toLowerCase()).toMatch(/proposed|no action/); + }); + + it('lists each remediation action with status and approver when present', () => { + const output = formatTriageNote( + baseEvidence({ + remediationActions: [ + { actionType: 'block_sender', status: 'approved', approvedBy: 'operator@example.com', approvedAt: '2026-07-01T00:00:00Z' }, + { actionType: 'purge_message', status: 'completed', approvedBy: 'operator@example.com', approvedAt: '2026-07-01T00:00:00Z' }, + ], + }) + ); + expect(output).toContain('block_sender'); + expect(output).toContain('approved'); + expect(output).toContain('purge_message'); + expect(output).toContain('completed'); + expect(output).toContain('operator@example.com'); + }); + + it('renders indicator URLs in sanitized form, dropping query strings', () => { + const output = formatTriageNote(baseEvidence({ urls: ['http://evil.example/p?token=leak'] })); + expect(output).not.toContain('token=leak'); + expect(output).toContain('http://evil.example/p'); + }); + + it('never leaks a secret embedded in free-text fields (sanitizeNoteText applied to whole output)', () => { + const output = formatTriageNote( + baseEvidence({ summary: 'Found link http://evil.example/x?access_token=SECRETVALUE in body' }) + ); + expect(output).not.toContain('access_token=SECRETVALUE'); + }); + + it('handles null verdict/confidence gracefully without throwing', () => { + expect(() => + formatTriageNote(baseEvidence({ verdict: null, confidence: null })) + ).not.toThrow(); + const output = formatTriageNote(baseEvidence({ verdict: null, confidence: null })); + expect(output.toLowerCase()).toContain('not yet classified'); + }); +}); From 17ba0e880fec958811503b225a187822080831dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lorentz Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 12:06:31 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 4/6] feat(21-01): implement triage-note formatter + TriageNoteEvidence contract - formatTriageNote renders verdict/confidence/summary/reasons/blast-radius (both branches)/recommended actions/current remediation state as prose - Routes indicator URLs through sanitizeUrl and the whole assembled output through sanitizeNoteText before returning - Handles null verdict/confidence gracefully - Exports TriageNoteEvidence interface for Plan 02 - All 9 formatter tests pass --- lib/services/triage-note-format.ts | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 133 insertions(+) create mode 100644 lib/services/triage-note-format.ts diff --git a/lib/services/triage-note-format.ts b/lib/services/triage-note-format.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..46a512c --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/services/triage-note-format.ts @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/** + * Triage-note formatter (Phase 21, NOTE-01). + * + * Pure, deterministic function that turns a structured campaign-evidence + * object (`TriageNoteEvidence`) into human-readable prose suitable for + * posting as an internal Autotask `TicketNotes` entry. No DB, network, or + * Autotask dependency — Plan 02's service gathers evidence and calls + * `formatTriageNote()`, then writes the resulting text. + * + * Every URL and the entire assembled string are routed through + * `triage-note-sanitize.ts` before being returned, so a secret/token/full + * malicious query string embedded in ANY source field (summary, reasons, + * URLs) is stripped regardless of which field it came from (D-04 "full + * picture" + NOTE-01 sanitization requirement). + */ + +import { sanitizeUrl, sanitizeNoteText } from './triage-note-sanitize'; +import type { BlastRadiusResult } from './mimecast-blast-radius'; + +export interface TriageNoteEvidence { + campaignId: string; + reportCount: number; + companyName?: string | null; + subject?: string | null; + verdict: 'SPAM' | 'UNWANTED' | 'THREAT' | null; + confidence: number | null; + summary: string | null; + reasons: string[]; + recommendedActions: string[]; + requiresApproval: boolean; + blastRadius: BlastRadiusResult; + remediationActions: Array<{ + actionType: string; + status: string; + approvedBy: string | null; + approvedAt: string | null; + }>; + urls: string[]; +} + +function formatBlastRadiusSection(blastRadius: BlastRadiusResult): string { + if (blastRadius.status === 'unavailable') { + const detail = blastRadius.error ? ` — ${blastRadius.error}` : ''; + return `Blast Radius: unavailable (reason: ${blastRadius.reason})${detail}`; + } + + return [ + 'Blast Radius:', + ` Matched: ${blastRadius.matched}`, + ` Delivered: ${blastRadius.delivered}`, + ` Held: ${blastRadius.held}`, + ` Rejected: ${blastRadius.rejected}`, + ` Clicked: ${blastRadius.clicked}`, + ].join('\n'); +} + +function formatRemediationSection( + remediationActions: TriageNoteEvidence['remediationActions'] +): string { + if (remediationActions.length === 0) { + return 'Current Remediation State: No action has been taken yet — recommended actions are proposed-only.'; + } + + const lines = remediationActions.map((action) => { + const approver = + action.approvedBy || action.approvedAt + ? ` (approver: ${action.approvedBy ?? 'unknown'}, approved at: ${action.approvedAt ?? 'unknown'})` + : ''; + return ` - ${action.actionType} — ${action.status}${approver}`; + }); + + return ['Current Remediation State:', ...lines].join('\n'); +} + +/** + * Assemble the full triage note as human-readable prose, sanitized so no + * secret/token/full malicious URL query string survives regardless of which + * evidence field it originated from. + */ +export function formatTriageNote(evidence: TriageNoteEvidence): string { + const verdictLabel = evidence.verdict ?? 'not yet classified'; + const confidenceLabel = + evidence.confidence === null || evidence.confidence === undefined + ? 'not yet classified' + : String(evidence.confidence); + + const headerLine = `Phishing Triage Summary — Campaign ${evidence.campaignId} (${evidence.reportCount} report${evidence.reportCount === 1 ? '' : 's'})`; + + const classificationSection = [ + 'Classification:', + ` Verdict: ${verdictLabel}`, + ` Confidence: ${confidenceLabel}`, + ` Summary: ${evidence.summary ?? 'not yet classified'}`, + ].join('\n'); + + const reasonsSection = + evidence.reasons.length > 0 + ? ['Reasons:', ...evidence.reasons.map((r) => ` - ${r}`)].join('\n') + : 'Reasons: none recorded'; + + const blastRadiusSection = formatBlastRadiusSection(evidence.blastRadius); + + const recommendedActionsSection = [ + 'Recommended Actions:', + evidence.recommendedActions.length > 0 + ? evidence.recommendedActions.map((a) => ` - ${a}`).join('\n') + : ' - none', + evidence.requiresApproval ? ' (requires operator approval)' : ' (no approval required)', + ].join('\n'); + + const remediationSection = formatRemediationSection(evidence.remediationActions); + + const urlsSection = + evidence.urls.length > 0 + ? ['Indicator URLs:', ...evidence.urls.map((u) => ` - ${sanitizeUrl(u)}`)].join('\n') + : null; + + const sections = [ + headerLine, + evidence.companyName ? `Company: ${evidence.companyName}` : null, + evidence.subject ? `Subject: ${evidence.subject}` : null, + classificationSection, + reasonsSection, + blastRadiusSection, + recommendedActionsSection, + remediationSection, + urlsSection, + ].filter((s): s is string => s !== null); + + const assembled = sections.join('\n\n'); + + return sanitizeNoteText(assembled); +} From 03bb56087458d43270b00befdb09bbfa37ba786b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lorentz Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 12:07:24 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 5/6] docs(21-01): complete triage-note sanitizer/formatter plan Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W6RuWdiUiXrPK6FLBHjtpY --- .../21-autotask-triage-note/21-01-SUMMARY.md | 105 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 105 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .planning/phases/21-autotask-triage-note/21-01-SUMMARY.md diff --git a/.planning/phases/21-autotask-triage-note/21-01-SUMMARY.md b/.planning/phases/21-autotask-triage-note/21-01-SUMMARY.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..740287b --- /dev/null +++ b/.planning/phases/21-autotask-triage-note/21-01-SUMMARY.md @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +--- +phase: 21-autotask-triage-note +plan: 01 +subsystem: api +tags: [phishing-triage, sanitization, autotask, vitest, pure-functions] + +# Dependency graph +requires: + - phase: 17-mimecast-blast-radius-lookup + provides: BlastRadiusResult discriminated union imported as a type + - phase: 19-classification-engine + provides: Verdict type and classification shape (verdict/confidence/summary/reasons/recommended_actions) this formatter summarizes + - phase: 20-remediation-approval-audit-safety + provides: remediation_actions status lifecycle (proposed/approved/completed) this formatter renders +provides: + - "sanitizeUrl / sanitizeNoteText pure functions (lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.ts)" + - "formatTriageNote(evidence) pure function + TriageNoteEvidence contract (lib/services/triage-note-format.ts)" +affects: [21-02-triage-note-service-and-endpoint] + +# Tech tracking +tech-stack: + added: [] + patterns: + - "SECURITY-CRITICAL module-header convention mirrored from lib/services/analyzer/itglue-redact.ts (why-it-exists doc-comment + exported-pure-function-for-tests shape)" + - "Formatter routes all free text and URLs through a shared sanitizer before returning, so no source field can bypass redaction" + +key-files: + created: + - lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.ts + - lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.test.ts + - lib/services/triage-note-format.ts + - lib/services/triage-note-format.test.ts + modified: [] + +key-decisions: + - "sanitizeUrl always strips query+fragment wholesale (never selectively keeps benign params) per NOTE-01's 'full malicious URL query strings' requirement" + - "sanitizeNoteText intentionally does NOT redact bare emails or hex attachment hashes — those are evidence per 21-CONTEXT.md Claude's Discretion, not credentials" + - "formatTriageNote passes its entire assembled string through sanitizeNoteText (not just discrete fields) so a secret embedded anywhere in free text is caught regardless of source field" + +patterns-established: + - "Pure-function-first design for security-critical text transforms: no I/O, fully unit-testable, consumed later by a thin service layer (Plan 02)" + +requirements-completed: [NOTE-01] + +# Metrics +duration: 2min +completed: 2026-07-16 +--- + +# Phase 21 Plan 01: Triage Note Sanitizer + Formatter Summary + +**Pure sanitizer (URL query/fragment stripping + Bearer/credential redaction) and pure formatter (`formatTriageNote`) turning classification + blast-radius + remediation-state evidence into human-readable, secret-free Autotask note text, both fully unit-tested with Vitest.** + +## Performance + +- **Duration:** ~2 min +- **Started:** 2026-07-16T12:04:58-04:00 +- **Completed:** 2026-07-16T12:06:31-04:00 +- **Tasks:** 2 completed +- **Files modified:** 4 (all newly created) + +## Accomplishments +- `sanitizeUrl` strips every URL down to scheme+host+path (query + fragment always removed), never throws on malformed input, falls back to truncating at `?`/`#` +- `sanitizeNoteText` redacts Bearer/Authorization tokens and credential-style query-param values (`token`, `access_token`, `password`, `api_key`, etc.) while explicitly preserving bare sender emails and attachment hashes as evidence +- `formatTriageNote` renders a `TriageNoteEvidence` object into labeled prose sections (header, Classification, Reasons, Blast Radius — both `ok`/`unavailable` branches, Recommended Actions, Current Remediation State, Indicator URLs), routing every URL through `sanitizeUrl` and the whole assembled string through `sanitizeNoteText` +- `TriageNoteEvidence` interface exported for Plan 02 to build its evidence-gathering service against + +## Task Commits + +Each task followed RED → GREEN (TDD): + +1. **Task 1: Sanitizer** - `cc93707` (test: RED, 8 failing tests) → `226f300` (feat: GREEN, all 8 pass) +2. **Task 2: Note formatter + TriageNoteEvidence contract** - `b4e05eb` (test: RED, 9 failing tests) → `17ba0e8` (feat: GREEN, all 9 pass) + +_TDD gate compliance: both tasks have a `test(...)` commit followed by a `feat(...)` commit; no refactor step was needed._ + +## Files Created/Modified +- `lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.ts` - `sanitizeUrl` + `sanitizeNoteText` pure functions with `REDACTED_MARKER` constant +- `lib/services/triage-note-sanitize.test.ts` - 8 Vitest cases covering query/fragment stripping, malformed-input safety, token/credential redaction, email/hash preservation +- `lib/services/triage-note-format.ts` - `TriageNoteEvidence` interface + `formatTriageNote(evidence)` pure function +- `lib/services/triage-note-format.test.ts` - 9 Vitest cases covering verdict/confidence rendering, both blast-radius branches, empty/populated remediation state, URL sanitization, whole-output secret redaction, null-verdict handling + +## Decisions Made +- Query strings are stripped unconditionally in `sanitizeUrl` — no allowlist of "safe" params, since selectively keeping some params risks missing a novel credential-param name (matches NOTE-01's wording exactly: "full malicious URL query strings"). +- `sanitizeNoteText` explicitly does not touch email addresses or hex hashes — confirmed as intentional in `21-CONTEXT.md` Claude's Discretion block (these are attacker-identity evidence, not secrets belonging to Pulse/its operators). +- `formatTriageNote` sanitizes the entire assembled output string (not just individual fields) as a defense-in-depth measure — if a future evidence field carries an embedded secret, it's still caught at the final sanitize pass regardless of which section it landed in. + +## Deviations from Plan + +None - plan executed exactly as written. Both tasks' ``, ``, and `` blocks were implemented as specified; no architectural changes, no missing critical functionality found, no blocking issues encountered. + +## Issues Encountered +None. + +## User Setup Required +None - no external service configuration required. Both modules are pure functions with no DB/network/Autotask dependency. + +## Next Phase Readiness +- `TriageNoteEvidence` interface and `formatTriageNote()` are ready for Plan 02 to import and build its evidence-gathering service + `POST /api/phishing/campaigns/{id}/triage-note` endpoint against. +- `sanitizeUrl`/`sanitizeNoteText` are exported and stable for direct reuse if Plan 02 needs to sanitize any additional free text outside the formatter's own URL list. +- No blockers. + +--- +*Phase: 21-autotask-triage-note* +*Completed: 2026-07-16* From 96734399e5e75ddf107b2c18fd6eb07e352b4477 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: lorentz Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 12:07:38 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 6/6] docs(21-01): append self-check result to summary --- .planning/phases/21-autotask-triage-note/21-01-SUMMARY.md | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/.planning/phases/21-autotask-triage-note/21-01-SUMMARY.md b/.planning/phases/21-autotask-triage-note/21-01-SUMMARY.md index 740287b..4ec9a81 100644 --- a/.planning/phases/21-autotask-triage-note/21-01-SUMMARY.md +++ b/.planning/phases/21-autotask-triage-note/21-01-SUMMARY.md @@ -103,3 +103,7 @@ None - no external service configuration required. Both modules are pure functio --- *Phase: 21-autotask-triage-note* *Completed: 2026-07-16* + +## Self-Check: PASSED + +All created files and task commit hashes verified present on disk / in git history.