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+---
+phase: 20-remediation-approval-audit-safety
+plan: 02
+subsystem: api
+tags: [nextjs, api-routes, permissions, better-auth, phishing-triage, audit-log]
+
+# Dependency graph
+requires:
+  - phase: 20-remediation-approval-audit-safety
+    provides: "Plan 01's transactional service layer (approveRemediationActions, remediateApprovedActions, markCampaignFalsePositive, writeAuditEvent) and its typed error classes"
+provides:
+  - "lib/permissions.ts grants phishing:approve and phishing:remediate to super-admin and admin roles only (D-02); userRole stays read-only"
+  - "POST /api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/approve — permission-gated, D-03 action-list body, delegates to approveRemediationActions"
+  - "POST /api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/remediate — permission-gated, delegates to remediateApprovedActions (idempotent completion)"
+  - "POST /api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/mark-false-positive — approve-tier gated (D-04), delegates to markCampaignFalsePositive"
+  - "classify route now writes a 'campaign_classified' audit event, completing REMED-06's four-action audit coverage"
+affects: [21-autotask-triage-note, 22-approval-ui-livelink]
+
+# Tech tracking
+tech-stack:
+  added: []
+  patterns:
+    - "Route shell precedent (from classify route) reused verbatim across all three new routes: requirePermission early-return, UUID_RE guard -> 400, campaign-exists SELECT -> 404, try/catch mapping typed service errors to HTTP status, actor derived from session.user.email never the request body"
+
+key-files:
+  created:
+    - "app/api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/approve/route.ts"
+    - "app/api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/remediate/route.ts"
+    - "app/api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/mark-false-positive/route.ts"
+  modified:
+    - "lib/permissions.ts"
+    - "app/api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/classify/route.ts"
+
+key-decisions:
+  - "mark-false-positive body parsing reads request.text() first and only JSON.parse()s if non-empty, so an absent/empty body is tolerated (no request.json() try/catch swallowing the 'no body sent' case as valid JSON parse failure)"
+  - "classify route's audit write happens inside the existing try/catch after classifyCampaign() succeeds; a write failure surfaces as a 500 even though the classification row has already committed (append-only, not rolled back) — documented inline"
+
+patterns-established:
+  - "Every state-changing phishing route destructures `session` (not just `error`) from requirePermission so the actor can be captured for the audit trail"
+
+requirements-completed: [REMED-02, REMED-03, REMED-04, REMED-05, REMED-06]
+
+# Metrics
+duration: 10min
+completed: 2026-07-16
+---
+
+# Phase 20 Plan 02: Remediation Approval Routes Summary
+
+**Three new permission-gated POST routes (approve/remediate/mark-false-positive) wired to Plan 01's service layer, plus a 'campaign_classified' audit event added to the existing classify route, completing all four state-changing actions' audit coverage.**
+
+## Performance
+
+- **Duration:** ~10 min
+- **Started:** 2026-07-16 (per orchestrator dispatch, wave 2)
+- **Completed:** 2026-07-16
+- **Tasks:** 3 completed
+- **Files modified:** 5 (3 created, 2 modified)
+
+## Accomplishments
+- `lib/permissions.ts` — `superAdminRole` and `adminRole` now grant `phishing: ["read", "analyze", "approve", "remediate"]` (D-02); `userRole` unchanged at `["read"]`, so a plain user is rejected 403 from all three new endpoints
+- `POST /api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/approve` — gated by `phishing:approve`, validates `{ actions: [{actionType, params?}] }` is a non-empty array (D-03), delegates to `approveRemediationActions`, maps `RemediationValidationError`→400 and `RemediationConflictError`→409
+- `POST /api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/remediate` — gated by `phishing:remediate`, no request body (D-01 — remediates whatever was previously approved), delegates to `remediateApprovedActions`, same error mapping
+- `POST /api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/mark-false-positive` — gated by `phishing:approve` (D-04 elevated tier, no separate action key), optional `{ reason? }` body, delegates to `markCampaignFalsePositive`, maps the D-04 conflict guard to 409
+- `classify/route.ts` extended to destructure `session` and write a `campaign_classified` audit event (via `writeAuditEvent`) after a successful classification — REMED-06's four-action audit coverage (classify/approve/remediate/mark-false-positive) is now complete
+
+## Task Commits
+
+Each task was committed atomically:
+
+1. **Task 1: Grant approve + remediate to admin roles (D-02)** - `80e7129` (feat)
+2. **Task 2: approve + remediate routes** - `65c4253` (feat)
+3. **Task 3: mark-false-positive route + classify audit wiring** - `1a12607` (feat)
+
+**Plan metadata:** (this commit)
+
+## Files Created/Modified
+- `lib/permissions.ts` - superAdminRole/adminRole grant phishing approve+remediate; userRole and the statement vocabulary unchanged
+- `app/api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/approve/route.ts` - POST approve endpoint (D-03 action-list body)
+- `app/api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/remediate/route.ts` - POST remediate endpoint (idempotent completion)
+- `app/api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/mark-false-positive/route.ts` - POST mark-false-positive endpoint (D-04 approve-tier gate)
+- `app/api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/classify/route.ts` - now writes a `campaign_classified` audit event after successful classification
+
+## Decisions Made
+- Body parsing in mark-false-positive uses `request.text()` + conditional `JSON.parse` rather than `request.json()` in a try/catch, so a genuinely empty body (no bytes sent) is treated as "no reason provided" rather than a parse failure — matches the plan's "tolerate an empty/absent body" instruction more precisely than a blanket try/catch around `request.json()` would (an empty body passed to `request.json()` throws, which would have incorrectly produced a 400 for the common case of "no reason given").
+- Kept the classify route's audit write inside the existing try/catch (as instructed) rather than isolating it in its own try/catch — a failure there surfaces as the route's existing 500 path, and the classification row itself is unaffected since it was already committed by `classifyCampaign` (append-only, no transaction spanning both).
+
+## Deviations from Plan
+
+None - plan executed exactly as written. All acceptance criteria (grep patterns for `requirePermission`, `UUID_RE`, `campaign_classified`, actor-from-session, and the two role permission-array greps) verified directly against the edited/created files.
+
+## Issues Encountered
+None.
+
+## User Setup Required
+
+None - no external service configuration required. No package installs.
+
+## Next Phase Readiness
+- All four phishing-triage state-changing actions (classify, approve, remediate, mark-false-positive) are now exposed over HTTP, permission-gated, and fully audited.
+- Plan 21 (Autotask triage note) and Plan 22 (Approval UI) can call these four routes directly; the JSON response shapes match the Plan 01 service return types (`ApprovedRemediationAction[]`, `RemediateResult`, `MarkFalsePositiveResult`, `ClassifyResult`).
+- No blockers. `npx tsc --noEmit --pretty` is clean at HEAD across all edited/created files.
+
+## Self-Check: PASSED
+
+All created files and commit hashes verified present on disk / in git log.
+
+---
+*Phase: 20-remediation-approval-audit-safety*
+*Completed: 2026-07-16*