wulf-pulse/.planning/phases/20-remediation-approval-audit-safety/20-VERIFICATION.md

phase	verified	status	score	overrides_applied
20-remediation-approval-audit-safety	2026-07-16T11:00:00Z	passed	6/6 must-haves verified	0

Phase 20: Remediation Approval & Audit Safety Verification Report

Phase Goal: Deliver a remediation/approval/audit-safety layer where recommended remediation actions are proposed-only until an operator explicitly approves them, remediation execution is idempotent and gated, false-positive marking is conflict-guarded, and every state-changing action (classify/approve/remediate/ mark-false-positive) is audit-logged and permission-gated.

Verified: 2026-07-16T11:00:00Z Status: passed Re-verification: No — initial verification

Goal Achievement

Observable Truths

#	Truth	Status	Evidence
1	REMED-01: Recommended actions are proposed, never auto-executed	VERIFIED	lib/services/campaign-classifier.ts has no INSERT into remediation_actions; remediation_actions.status defaults to 'proposed' in migration 097; only approveRemediationActions creates 'approved' rows, only on explicit operator call.
2	REMED-02: Operator can approve via POST /approve, recording approver, timestamp, exact params	VERIFIED	app/api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/approve/route.ts gates requirePermission('phishing','approve'), captures actor from session.user.email (never request body), delegates to approveRemediationActions which inserts approved_by=actor, approved_at=NOW(), params=$3::jsonb per action, validated against latest classifications.recommended_actions. Unit tests confirm reject-if-not-recommended and reject-if-no-classification.
3	REMED-03: POST /remediate proceeds only for approved actions, non-destructive-by-default (simulated), never silently succeeds	VERIFIED	remediateApprovedActions throws RemediationValidationError when zero remediation_actions rows exist (route maps to 400). Only status='approved' rows transition; effect is simulated (UPDATE ... status='completed', no external provider call per D-01, confirmed via grep — 0 matches for not_implemented outside comments and no HTTP/client calls to Mimecast/other providers in this file).
4	REMED-04: Re-running remediation is idempotent	VERIFIED	remediateApprovedActions selects FOR UPDATE and only acts on status='approved' rows; already-completed rows are skipped (no UPDATE, no audit write). Test is idempotent: a second call transitions nothing and writes no second audit row asserts 0 additional UPDATE calls and audit-write count stays at 2 across two calls.
5	REMED-05: Operator can mark false positive via API, blocked when remediation approved/completed exists	VERIFIED	mark-false-positive/route.ts gated requirePermission('phishing','approve'), delegates to markCampaignFalsePositive, which runs a SELECT ... WHERE status IN ('approved','completed') FOR UPDATE guard before any write; a hit throws RemediationConflictError -> route returns 409. Test confirms guard trips and confirms happy-path sets campaigns.status='false_positive'.
6	REMED-06: Every state-changing action (classify/approve/remediate/mark-false-positive) writes an audit event	VERIFIED	writeAuditEvent is the single INSERT path into audit_events (grep confirms no other file inserts into this table). All three remediation-service functions call it inside the same postgresClient.transaction as their state write (atomic — rollback discards both). classify/route.ts was edited to call writeAuditEvent({..., eventType:'campaign_classified'}) after classifyCampaign() succeeds, closing the fourth action.

Score: 6/6 truths verified

Required Artifacts

Artifact	Expected	Status	Details
lib/services/phishing-audit.ts	writeAuditEvent(input, client?) single audit insert path	VERIFIED	55 lines, parameterized INSERT ($1-$4), returns RETURNING id::text, accepts optional transaction client.
lib/services/remediation-service.ts	approve/remediate/mark-false-positive + typed errors	VERIFIED	279 lines. Exports approveRemediationActions, remediateApprovedActions, markCampaignFalsePositive, RemediationValidationError, RemediationConflictError — all present and match plan signatures.
lib/services/remediation-service.test.ts	idempotency/audit/D-04/recommended-only proofs	VERIFIED	259 lines, 8 real behavioral test cases (not tautological — fake transaction client records actual SQL calls and asserts on them).
lib/services/phishing-audit.test.ts	writer proof	VERIFIED	3 tests: standalone insert, injected-client routing.
lib/permissions.ts	grants approve+remediate to admin/super-admin only	VERIFIED	superAdminRole and adminRole both phishing: ["read","analyze","approve","remediate"]; userRole remains phishing: ["read"]. hasPermission() enforces this at runtime (not just declared) — verified by reading lib/auth-utils.ts requirePermission() which calls hasPermission(userRole, resource, action) and returns 403 on failure.
app/api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/approve/route.ts	POST approve endpoint	VERIFIED	77 lines. Permission gate, UUID guard, JSON body validation, actor from session, error mapping (400/409/500), delegates to service.
app/api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/remediate/route.ts	POST remediate endpoint	VERIFIED	64 lines. Same shell, phishing:remediate gate, no body required.
app/api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/mark-false-positive/route.ts	POST mark-false-positive endpoint	VERIFIED	76 lines. phishing:approve gate, optional-body tolerant JSON parse, 409 on conflict.
app/api/phishing/campaigns/[id]/classify/route.ts	audit event wiring	VERIFIED	Edited to destructure session, import writeAuditEvent, call it post-classify with eventType:'campaign_classified'.

Key Link Verification

From	To	Via	Status	Details
remediation-service.ts	audit_events	writeAuditEvent(client) inside postgresClient.transaction	WIRED	All three functions call writeAuditEvent(..., client) using the same transaction client as their state write — atomic.
remediation-service.ts	classifications.recommended_actions	latest-classification read validates approvable types	WIRED	approveRemediationActions selects ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1 and rejects non-recommended action types before any insert.
remediation-service.ts	remediation_actions.status	FOR UPDATE status filter drives idempotent completion	WIRED	Confirmed via grep + test (FOR UPDATE present in both remediateApprovedActions and the D-04 guard in markCampaignFalsePositive).
approve/route.ts	approveRemediationActions	requirePermission('phishing','approve') -> service delegation	WIRED	Route imports and calls the function directly with (id, actions, actor); not a stub — errors from the service propagate to typed HTTP status mapping.
remediate/route.ts	remediateApprovedActions	requirePermission('phishing','remediate') -> service delegation	WIRED	Same pattern confirmed.
mark-false-positive/route.ts	markCampaignFalsePositive	requirePermission('phishing','approve') -> service delegation	WIRED	Same pattern confirmed.
classify/route.ts	writeAuditEvent	post-classify audit write	WIRED	Call is inside the existing try block after classifyCampaign(id) succeeds.
routes	middleware.ts	auth gate	WIRED	/api/phishing/* is NOT in middleware.ts's public-route allowlist (confirmed via grep — zero matches), so unauthenticated requests are redirected/blocked before reaching route-level requirePermission.

Behavioral Spot-Checks

Behavior	Command	Result	Status
Service unit tests (11 assertions across approve/remediate/mark-fp/audit-writer)	npx vitest run lib/services/phishing-audit.test.ts lib/services/remediation-service.test.ts	2 files, 11 tests, all passed	PASS
Type check	npx tsc --noEmit --pretty	clean, no output	PASS
Full test suite regression	npx vitest run	369/371 passing; 2 failures isolated to lib/services/analyzer/itglue-search.test.ts	PASS (pre-existing, out-of-scope failure confirmed — last touched by commit 8f8b5ab, an unrelated earlier commit, not part of this phase's diff)
No auto-execution of remediation on classify	grep -n "remediation_actions" lib/services/campaign-classifier.ts	no matches	PASS
Single audit insert path	grep -rn "INSERT INTO audit_events" across lib/ and app/	only in phishing-audit.ts	PASS

Requirements Coverage

Requirement	Source Plan	Description	Status	Evidence
REMED-01	20-01	Proposed-only, never auto-executed	SATISFIED	See Truth 1
REMED-02	20-01, 20-02	Approve via API, records approver/timestamp/params	SATISFIED	See Truth 2
REMED-03	20-01, 20-02	Remediate only proceeds for approved, non-destructive, never silent success	SATISFIED	See Truth 3
REMED-04	20-01	Idempotent re-run	SATISFIED	See Truth 4
REMED-05	20-01, 20-02	Mark false positive via API	SATISFIED	See Truth 5
REMED-06	20-01, 20-02	Every state-changing action audited	SATISFIED	See Truth 6

Note: .planning/REQUIREMENTS.md still lists REMED-01..06 as "Pending" in its coverage table (lines 198-203) and unchecked ([ ]) in the requirement list — this is a tracking-document staleness issue, not a code gap. Recommend updating REQUIREMENTS.md status table as a follow-up, but it does not block phase goal achievement since the underlying code is verified.

Anti-Patterns Found

None found in the phase's modified/created files. No TODO/FIXME/HACK/PLACEHOLDER markers, no empty handlers, no hardcoded empty returns feeding into rendering, no not_implemented code paths (only descriptive prose in comments, explicitly called out in 20-01-SUMMARY.md as a deliberate wording fix to avoid tripping the D-01 grep check).

Human Verification Required

None. This phase is service + API layer only (no new UI in this phase — Phase 22 covers the approval UI). All behaviors are verifiable via code inspection, unit tests, and static grep checks.

Gaps Summary

No gaps found. All six REMED requirements are backed by real, non-stub implementations:

• The service layer (phishing-audit.ts, remediation-service.ts) performs real parameterized SQL, real transactional atomicity between state writes and audit writes, and real validation logic (not pass-through stubs).
• The route layer enforces real permission checks (requirePermission calls hasPermission against actual role definitions, returning 403 on failure — not just declaring permissions without enforcing them).
• Idempotency and the D-04 conflict guard are proven by unit tests that assert on actual SQL call counts and audit-write counts, not just "does not throw."
• Actor identity is derived from the server session in all three new routes and in the classify route edit — never from request body, closing the spoofing/repudiation threat noted in the phase's own threat model.

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Verified: 2026-07-16T11:00:00Z Verifier: Claude (gsd-verifier)